The US assumes jurisdiction over banks because they use the US dollar. The US assumes jurisdiction over the poor because they use Hotmail accounts. Google "Waterloo Suresh" who was a law student extradited from Canada to the US. https://t.co/YCUfL5xqav
— U.S. Citizen Abroad (@USCitizenAbroad) May 26, 2020
On December 14, 2012 the Supreme Court of Canada, in the unanimous decision in Sriskandarajah v. United States of America, 2012 SCC 70,  3 S.C.R. 609 authored by (then) Chief Justice McLachlin, confirmed the extradition of Suresh Sriskandarajah to the United States. The decision was short, to the point and expressed the court’s view that extradition decisions were within the discretion of the Minister Of Justice. The crux of the decision appears to be paragraph 33 which includes:
As explained above, the Minister’s order of surrender is a political decision that attracts a high degree of judicial deference. The Extradition Act confers broad discretion on the Minister’s decision to extradite
In other words, the presumption is that, the Supreme Court of Canada will NOT review extradition orders.
It’s as though, the US Canada Extradition Treaty means that:
1. The extradition request from the United States is mechanical (even though none of the conduct occurred within the United States); and
2. The willingness to extradite an individual from Canada to the United States is mechanical.
It appears that individuals who are the subject of an extradition request from Canada to the United States, have fewer legal protections, than do individuals charged with a crime in Canada …
It’s almost as though, the extradition process is designed to circumvent (or at least “water down”), the protections (such as they are), that individuals are afforded if their trials take place in Canada.
Interestingly (and predictably), when extradited to the United States, Mr. Sriskandarajah pleaded guilty, preferring the certainty of a two year period of incarceration, to the maximum which would be sought should he have suggested that he was innocent. The Canada US extradition treaty appears to be a way that the United States can export its version of criminal law into Canada. One wonders whether Canada should even have an extradition treaty with the United States. Conrad Black considers this in a recent article …
— U.S. Citizen Abroad (@USCitizenAbroad) May 26, 2020
On December 14, 2012 (the day the decision was released), Mr. Sriskandarajah was completing his first semester at a Canadian law school. He is now apparently back in Canada and (having completed law school) seeking a license to practise law in Ontario.
Justice McLachlin’s decision was short and joined by the rest of the judges. Of most significance (I think is) …
6. Were the Minister’s Decisions Unreasonable?
 The appellants argue that the Minister’s decisions to order their surrender to the United States was unreasonable because he failed to consider all relevant factors bearing on the Cotroni assessment. In particular, they submit, the Minister failed to address (1) the weak American claim of jurisdiction over the appellants’ alleged conduct, and (2) the ability to prosecute in Canada. Accordingly, extradition was an unjustifiable limitation on the appellants’ s. 6(1) rights.
 As explained above, the Minister’s order of surrender is a political decision that attracts a high degree of judicial deference. The Extradition Act confers broad discretion on the Minister’s decision to extradite: s. 7 .
 In these cases, the record shows that the Minister properly considered and weighed the factors relevant to the situation of the appellants. With respect to the appellants’ first concern, the Minister found that the “negative impact of [their] actions, when considered in concert with the alleged actions of [their] many co-conspirators, would have been felt in jurisdictions outside of Canada”, implicitly including the United States (A.R., vol. I, at pp. 54 and 60). Additionally, it seems clear on the facts alleged here that the conduct described is connected in one way or another with the use of e-mail accounts, companies and bank accounts based within the United States. With respect to the appellants’ second concern, the Minister considered whether prosecution should proceed in Canada and concluded that this factor did not negate extradition.
 In concluding that extradition was a justifiable limitation of the appellants’ s. 6(1) right, the Minister provided five reasons which were relevant: the investigation was initiated and developed by American authorities; charges have been laid in the U.S.; the U.S. is ready to proceed to trial; all of the co-accuseds have been charged in the U.S.; and most of the witnesses are located in the U.S. Contrary to the suggestion of the appellants (Sriskandarajah factum, at paras. 78-82), the Minister did not ascribe determinative weight to the fact that the PPSC decided not to lay charges in Canada against them. The Minister conducted an independent Cotroni assessment and concluded that the surrender of the appellants would not unjustifiably violate their s. 6(1) rights, principally on the basis of the fact that the U.S. had taken the lead in investigating and prosecuting the actions of the appellants. The Minister’s conclusion that there were sufficient links to the U.S. to justify extradition flowed from this independent assessment and has not been shown to be unreasonable on the evidence.
 The claim that the Minister’s decision was unreasonable must be rejected.
 The appeals are dismissed and the orders of surrender confirmed.